

# TOLERANCE, PLURALISM AND SOCIAL COHESION

# THE ACCEPT PLURALISM TOLERANCE INDICATORS TOOLKIT



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# 1 INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

The ACCEPT PLURALISM project is concerned with the cultural diversity that characterises European societies and the ways in which it is possible to enhance societal cohesion while respecting ethnic, religious and cultural plurality. The project debates the principles, practices, and institutional arrangements that are needed to promote tolerance and/or acceptance of cultural differences while maintaining social cohesion.

During the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Europe has been experiencing increasing tensions between national majorities and ethnic or religious minorities, particularly with marginalised Roma populations and post-migration Muslim communities. These tensions have at times taken the expression of public riots (e.g. the revolt of marginalised youth in France in 2005, riots in northern England in 2001), terrorist acts (the London bombings in 2005 and the Madrid bombings in 2004), racially motivated violence such as that registered in Italy in the small city of Rosarno in Calabria in January 2010 and the pogroms against Asian- or African-looking people in inner city areas of Athens in March 2011, or isolated but still tragic murders either by fanatic Muslims (like the murder of Van Gogh in the Netherlands), or by fanatic chauvinists like the collective murder of 69 young people in Norway in the summer of 2011.

Collateral effects of this malaise, at the political level, are the rise of far right wing parties and groupings with explicitly xenophobic and racist agendas targeting both native minorities and immigrant communities. While the rise of the far right has been registered in several 'old host' countries of northern and Western Europe

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<sup>1</sup> These indicators have been the fruit of a collective effort: Special thanks to Hara Kouki for providing sources on existing indicators and to Inge Versteegt for providing an additional list of what exists 'out there', special thanks also to Maurizio Ambrosini and Marko Hajdinjak for providing concrete suggestions for additional sub indicators or for re-ordering the existing ones, and also to Iseult Honohan and Nathalie Rougier for detailed critical comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Jon Fox and Jan Dobbernack for overall remarks and suggestions on how these indicators can fit our theoretical framework and empirical research concerns. This final version was edited and completed by a 'task force' composed of: Maurizio Ambrosini, Jan Dobbernack, Angéline Escafré-Dublet, Jon Fox, Marko Hajdinjak, Lasse Lindekilde, Nathalie Rougier and Anna Triandafyllidou.

already in the 1990s (Front National in France, Lega Nord in Italy, Vlaamse Blok in Flanders, Belgium), the far right is sadly gaining ground also in ‘new host’ countries like Greece where both the LAOS and Chrysi Avgi political parties are a new phenomenon and in countries with large native but no immigrant minorities such as Hungary with the spectacular rise of the Jobbik party in recent years.

It is in this context that the ACCEPT PLURALISM project has investigated in the period 2010-2012 different claims for the accommodation of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity in school life and in politics in 16 European countries<sup>2</sup>. The aim of the project is twofold. At the theoretical level, we consider the links between different concepts and principles used to inform policies and practices for accommodating diversity. We thus elaborate on the concept and practice of tolerance, acceptance, respect of diversity but also citizenship, multicultural citizenship in particular, national heritage and national identity; we consider liberalism and liberal intolerance, pluralism and plural nationalism.

At the empirical level we assess the main challenges that provoke debates about what should not be tolerated, what should be tolerated and what should be not only tolerated but actually accepted and respected. We analyse the principles and arguments used in these debates by different social and political actors involved and examine the practices of intolerance, tolerance and acceptance registered and/or the policies adopted when there is a contested issue.

We particularly investigate two areas of public policy, notably education and more specifically challenges that arise in school life; and secondly, politics and issues that concern political life. Through our empirical studies we also seek to identify what kind of ethnic, cultural or religious diversity claims are considered intolerable in European societies. Where are the boundaries between rejection, tolerance and acceptance drawn, why and by whom?

Taking into account the different historical experiences of the countries studied in the post war period and particularly during the last 20-30 years (in terms of state formation/consolidation, native minority accommodation, immigration and related policies for integrating migrants) we have sought to highlight the specific contexts and traditions of intolerance, tolerance or acceptance and respect of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in each country. We have looked at contentious issues where minority or migrant groups have asked for the accommodation of their needs or for the recognition of their own cultural and religious traditions in specific institutional and everyday life contexts, in particular in school life and in politics.

Our contested issues have been selected on the basis of their raising a case for tolerance or acceptance of diversity or indeed a case of intolerance or rejection of diversity. We have investigated the discourses and concepts evoked by the various stakeholders (state actors, civil society, and generally involved social actors such as for instance educators, religious leaders, teacher trade unions in the case of school life issues, or politicians, activists, journalists, writers and other experts with regard to political issues) to deal with the contested issues. In addition, we have

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<sup>2</sup> The project covers a wide range of European countries: notably western European states (Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK) with a long experience in receiving and incorporating immigrant minorities; ‘new’ migrant host countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland); central European countries that have recently joined the EU (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland) and Turkey, an associated state, all countries that mostly experience emigration rather than immigration but are also characterised by a significant variety of native minority populations.

investigated the concrete policies and practices adopted in the different countries with a view to assessing what are the concepts and principles informing these policies and practices.

Apart from investigating theoretically and empirically the challenges that cultural, ethnic and religious diversity raises in European societies and the ways in which these are debated and addressed, the ACCEPT PLURALISM project aims at creating a tool for assessing the levels of intolerance, tolerance and/or acceptance of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in European societies. On the basis of our findings from our national case studies and the comparison among them, we develop here a set of qualitative tolerance indicators that seek to translate into assessment of Low / Medium / High the presence or absence of specific features in a country's policies, practices and discourses.

Our indicators assess policies but also discourses and practices. They aim to evaluate the overall intolerance/tolerance/acceptance 'climate' in a country and not just its public policies. They are a tool for assessing whether European societies are becoming more or less tolerant in the last decade. The indicators aim to offer an overview of the 15 European countries studied. Although they do not cover all EU27 member states they cover a number of countries large enough to provide an overall assessment of the situation in Europe.

Last but not least, while the use of these indicators provides a snapshot picture, a synchronic evaluation of where each society is positioned on an intolerance / tolerance / acceptance scale, these indicators can be used in the future to assess whether a given society is becoming more or less tolerant. Alternatively, they can also be used to assess the same country in the past and consider how it has developed in recent years.

These indicators and our country assessments can function in support of the key messages for national and European policy makers that we have elaborated in the ACCEPT PLURALISM policy papers.

In introducing the ACCEPT PLURALISM Tolerance Indicators, this paper starts by discussing the scope and nature of social indicators in general and briefly reviews some widely known types of social indicators. It then proceeds to discuss more specifically indicators for tolerance and related social phenomena such as democracy, social cohesion, citizenship acquisition and practice and of course to present our proposed of ethnic and religious tolerance indicators.

## 1.1 Social Indicators

The [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](#) (OECD) defines a Social Indicator (SI) as a "direct and valid statistical measure which monitors levels and changes over time in a fundamental social concern." A social concern is in turn defined as "an identifiable and definable aspiration or concern of fundamental and direct importance to human well-being."

Indicators may be material, such as numbers related to economic growth, and/or immaterial, such as values or goals. Atkinson et al. (2002; 2005) consider Social Indicators as a parsimonious set of specific indices covering a broad range of social concerns. This set may include statistics similar to economic statistics of, for instance, national accounts. Such statistics are intended to provide a basis for making concise, comprehensive and balanced judgments about the conditions of society

regarding important issues of concern such as levels of wealth or poverty, health, education, the labour market.

Social indicators may include simple statistics (e.g. number of children per family, number of children per school, number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants) but they are often constructed as complex statistical indexes that cover a broader domain. For instance, in assessing the quality of life in a given city or country, several social indicators are used including demographic features, economic data, environmental data, public attitudes (citizens' self assessment of their quality of life) and a combination of those.

Social indicators of any kind are socially constructed and historically situated: they are specific to a given society at a given historical moment. Indeed, any kind of assessment of social concerns includes explicitly or implicitly a value judgement, a specific conception of what is 'good' for society, and what is a 'good society', a 'good life' or a 'good policy'. This is an issue of special concern as often measurements of 'quality of life' are presented as 'objective' and 'neutral' because they measure changes in the living standards of people. This tends to neglect that the decision to select specific issues to measure and/or improve, is by no means a value free, objective question; rather, it is an issue that depends on the social and cultural context. Second, it is often forgotten that quality of life and related indices include measurements of the subjective well being of people. Der Maesen and Walker (2007) point to the fact that there can be a multitude of responses as regards what is a good life, that represent the individual preferences of people. Such preferences may be to a certain extent culturally defined but always also include an individual component. Philips (2006) points to the fact that the inclusion or exclusion of particular domains may be a matter of common sense or up to the individual researcher or policy maker. In short, the normative aspects inherent in all social indicators about what is 'social quality' should not be neglected. The role of social indicator indexes in the policy process thus should be always open to question and criticism.

In addition, many of the items that construct an indicator are related to specific cultural or religious traditions that characterise a given society. For instance, measuring churchgoing on Sunday as an indication of religiosity is not an objective expression of religiosity, valid for all religions in all countries at all times, but rather it is a measurement of religiosity within a specific religious tradition at a given historical time.

## 1.2 The usefulness of Social Indicators – a word of caution

During the last two decades and in particular during the last five years, there has been a proliferation of social indicators (Foa and Tanner 2011). International organizations, think-tanks, and academics in the quantitative social sciences have designed composite indices to assess broad social science concepts such as good governance or human development. A leading role in this area is played by international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank. Composite indices developed recently include the by now well known Human Development Index (HDI), the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), the Doing Business (DB) indicators, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Think tanks and non governmental organisations such as Transparency International or Freedom House have created composite indices focusing on specific issues such as the Political Rights and Civil Liberties indices, the Quality of Life index, and the Corruptions Perceptions Index (for more, see United Nations 2007, Doing Business 2005,

Kaufman et al. 1999, Lambsdorff 2006). Bandura and Martin del Campo (2006 cit. in Foa and Tanner 2011), found that of the 160 composite cross-country indices now in existence, 83% had been generated since 1991 and 50% in the previous five years alone, while, before 1991 there were less than 20% of the composite indices found available today.

Foa and Tanner (2011) note that there has been a growing trend of creating composite social indices as these present a series of advantages: they have the ability to summarize complex or multi-dimensional issues in a simple manner (e.g. the measurement of GDP per capita provides an overview over the state of an economy that would otherwise require a complicated table of the output of different industries and sectors); they are easier to produce and update regularly and easier to communicate to ordinary citizens, including stakeholders. According to Foa and Tanner (ibid.) composite indices may also provide a starting point for public debate both at the national and international level. For instance, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (1999) or the Ease of Doing Business Index (2001) make the concept of 'good governance' more palpable and measurable. They also raise the issue of what is and ought to be understood by quality of governance.

However, Saltelli (2007) notes also that ill designed composite indicators may hide important imbalances and be misleading. For instance, the sustainability index, cited in a major newspaper, rewarded oil and gas exporting countries higher due to the large budget surplus that could be created by higher commodity prices. As the author noted, in this case the composite indicator was misinforming readers. Foa and Tanner (2011) actually specify the methodological decisions required when constructing aggregate measures.

## 1.3 Examples of Social Indicators

Many well known examples of widely used social indicators concern the area of socio-economic development. The World Bank provides for its own Social Indicators of Development<sup>3</sup> which contain detailed data regarding human welfare with a view to assessing the social effects of economic development. The World Bank web site however argues for caution in assessing its indicators' usefulness: users should bear in mind that the concepts, definitions and methodology underlying indicators may vary significantly from country to country, and even over time within countries. The data also are affected by differences in the ways in which information is collected. Thus, while indicators are useful for assessing broad trends and differences, little significance should be attached to small differences among indicators.

The United Nations is another international organisation which devotes significant efforts<sup>4</sup> to providing for social indicators. Social indicators covering a wide

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<sup>3</sup> The World Bank gathers data for over 170 economies worldwide, omitting only those for which data are inadequate. It puts emphasis on country-by-country review. Up to 94 indicators are reported for each country including: size, growth, and structure of population; determinants of population growth (including data on fertility and infant mortality); labour force; education and illiteracy; natural resources; income and poverty; expenditure on food, housing, fuel and power, transport and communication; and investment in medical care and education. Each of these indicators is broken into several subcategories. Few indicators are assessed annually. Rather three different time spans are used (older, moderately recent and more recent, 1990s onwards). For more information see [www.ciesin.org/IC/wbank/sid-home.html](http://www.ciesin.org/IC/wbank/sid-home.html) last accessed on 4 May 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Their publications are available at: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/xgrp2.htm> and <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/>, last accessed on 5 May 2012.

range of subject-matter fields are compiled by the Statistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, from many national and international sources. They consist mainly of a minimum list covering population (demographics), housing, work health and education issues. They cover the areas identified for follow-up and monitoring by major UN conferences on children, population and development, social development and women (United Nations 1996).

Not surprisingly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also collects socio-economic indicators<sup>5</sup> and monitors social and economic development in its member countries with a view to providing for a tool for assessing and improving policies and performance. OECD indicators are biennial and cover a wide range of issues. They are collected from a variety of national and international sources and surveys.

OECD indicators are organised in relation to the particular aspect of social life that is of concern each time. Thus, there are five categories of indicators: *General context* indicators include household income, fertility, migration, family, old age support rate and seek to assess overall the level of socio-economic development of a given country. Indicators on *self-sufficiency* include data on employment/unemployment, student performance, pensionable years, education spending. *Equity* indicators include data on income inequality, poverty rates, income difficulties, social spending. *Health* indicators include life expectancy, infant mortality, water and air quality, public health spending. Last but not least and coming closer to the issues that concern us here, OECD measures *social cohesion* through a set of indicators assessing trust, confidence in social institutions, pro- and anti-social behaviour, voting, and tolerance. The OECD social cohesion indicators include data from the World Gallup Survey, the European Social Value Survey, and the International Social Value Survey. Each social cohesion indicator may be assessed by a single question (e.g. people have to agree / disagree with the statement such as “Most people can be trusted”) or by a set of questions (e.g. three different questions concerning the pro or anti social behaviour of people including whether they donate money, participate to civic activities etc.) or may even be a composite indicator (e.g. bringing together the corruption index and the trust in institutions national index to assess confidence in social institutions in a given country).

## 1.4 Indicators in the field of democracy and citizenship

In line with the overall proliferation of indicators in assessing social and economic well being, in recent years we have witnessed an increase in indicators that assess issues related to the wider field of interest of the ACCEPT PLURALISM research project, notably in the field of democracy and citizenship as well as inter-group cohesion.

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<sup>5</sup> See [www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en\\_2649\\_37419\\_2671576\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_37419,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en_2649_37419_2671576_1_1_1_37419,00.html) last accessed on 5 May 2012.



## 1.4.1 Democracy Indicators

In a most recent study, Coppedge and Gerring (2011) review the meaning of democracy seeking to deconstruct its necessary and sufficient features with a view to providing a basis for constructing solid and comprehensive democracy indicators. They point to widely used indicators of democracy such as those constructed by Freedom House<sup>6</sup> to measure the state of political rights and civil liberties. Their political rights index refers to (a) Electoral Process, (b) Pluralism and Participation, and (c) Functioning of Government. The Civil Liberties index comprises (a) Freedom of Expression, (b) Association and Organizational Rights, (c) Rule of Law, and (d) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. Freedom House employs these two indices (“Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties”) in tandem. Each index extends back to 1972 and covers most sovereign and semi-sovereign nations. Polity IV<sup>7</sup> provides two aggregate indices, “Democracy” and “Autocracy,” usually used in tandem (by subtracting one from the other), which provides the Polity2 variable. Coverage extends back to 1800 for most sovereign countries with populations greater than 500,000. The Democracy/Dictatorship indicator (DD, see Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) codes countries dichotomously (democracy/dictatorship), including most sovereign countries from 1946 to the present.

## 1.4.2 Citizenship Indicators and Statistics

The most widely used among these is the MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) access to nationality index. The MIPEX offers an attempt to measure policies in the realm of immigrant integration against a standard of best practice drawn from Council of Europe Conventions or European Community Directives. Data are collected by means of expert surveys in which the respective national legislations are evaluated. It has gained wide currency and recognition in the past 4-5 years at the European level.<sup>8</sup>

The Howard’s Citizenship Policy Index CPI based on data from the NATAC project (The Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative Developments) integrates three elements (ius soli, naturalisation requirements, and dual citizenship). It offers a straightforward indicator as it is based on information that is clearly specified in national laws.<sup>9</sup>

A recent attempt of measuring citizenship rights of immigrants are the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) indicators has been developed by Ruud Koopmans and his collaborators (see Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibal, 2012). The ICRI indicators include 42 sub-indicators which involve not only legal but also cultural aspects that depend on jurisprudence, administrative decrees

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<sup>6</sup> [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

<sup>7</sup> [www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm)

<sup>8</sup> For details see [www.mipex.eu](http://www.mipex.eu)

<sup>9</sup> The earliest attempt for a citizenship and integration policy index was the LOI Legal Obstacles to Integration Index. There are two more indexes: the Thomas Janoski’s Barriers to Naturalization Index BNI and the Sara Wallace Goodman’s CIVIX index for naturalisation tests. One may observe that citizenship law and practice and citizenship acquisition are important aspects of migrant integration which can relatively easily be assessed and quantified, hence they attract a lot of interest in terms of developing related indicators. They are also seen as cardinal for overall social and economic integration assessments.

and local implementation practices – information that is quite difficult to find and code. Both Howard (2009: 32-35) and Koopmans et al. (2010: 12-13) use correlation tests to compare their own indicators with each other and in addition make a comparison with the Migration Integration Policy Indices (MIPEX) (MPG 2006). Koopmans and collaborators additionally compare their indicator with the Legal Obstacles to Integration-Index (LOI, Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997).

A more comprehensive set of citizenship indicators is currently being developed by the EUDO project. EUDO Citizenship Law Indicators (CITLAW) aim to describe and compare characteristic aspects of citizenship laws across countries and over time. They include a large set of indicators based on a classification of citizenship law provisions that serve specific purposes, such as securing the intergenerational continuity of the citizenry through birthright acquisition, determining the extent of territorial inclusion of the resident population through *ius soli* and residence requirements for naturalisation, regulating the overlap with other state's citizenship regimes through restrictions or toleration of multiple citizenship, maintaining citizenship links with extraterritorial populations and defining target groups and conditions for regular or facilitated naturalisation.

CITLAW indicators serve primarily for comparing specific aspects of citizenship regimes across countries and time. In addition, the EUDO Project provides for citizenship acquisition rates (CITACQ indicators) which collect data in order to measure, compare and explain the quantitative aspects of citizenship acquisition across Europe. They present data about citizenship acquisition in European countries with a specific focus on the naturalisation of immigrants. Data are derived from publicly accessible national sources in countries covered by the project EUDO CITIZENSHIP. These sources are typically national statistics agencies, but also Ministries of Justice or Home Affairs, Immigration and Naturalisation Services, or Immigration Boards. EUDO CITACQ aims to cover a broad set of modes of acquisition. For each country, insofar as these are available, users can find aggregate data from 1985 onwards on the following characteristics of citizenship acquisitions: total number of acquisitions, mode of acquisition (procedure), citizenship of origin, country of birth, region of residence, sex, age, decisions on applications for naturalisation. The EUDO project also provides indicators for Citizenship Implementation comparing the formal aspects of acquisition procedures and Citizenship Integration indicators assessing the impact of citizenship and migrant integration.<sup>10</sup>

### 1.4.3 Inter-group Cohesion Indicators

Several quantitative studies on public attitudes have measures on inter-group cohesion. The concept of inter-group cohesion is based on the broader notion of social cohesion, which is defined by the Council of Europe as: 'the capacity of a society to ensure the well-being of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation' (Council of Europe 2009). A more academic definition is provided by Beck and co authors (1997: 284): 'Social cohesion concerns the processes that create, defend or demolish social networks and the social infrastructures underpinning these networks. An adequate level of social cohesion is one which enables citizens "to exist as real human subjects, as social beings"'. Berman and Philips (2004: 2) note that social cohesion is inextricably related to the existence of

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<sup>10</sup> For more see <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators>

legislative frameworks for legal, political and social protection, of cultural norms and mores relating to citizenship, cultural pluralism, tolerance and respect; to the existence of a vibrant civil society. At the normative level, social cohesion implies the maximisation of solidarity and shared identity. There is, however, an inherent tension between solidarity and homogeneity.

We understand social cohesion as closely related to social quality, where social quality is defined as ‘the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential’ (Beck et al., 1997:3 cit. in Berman and Philips 2004:1). In this case, social cohesion entails the sort of solidarity that facilitates and nurtures group membership and loyalty while at the same time respecting diversity and difference (Joppke and Lukes, 1999).

It follows from the above that measuring social cohesion includes an important component of measuring inter-group cohesion. Indeed, the degree of tolerance/acceptance of minority groups is a measurable dimension of social cohesion.

Below we present a list of measurements used to assess inter-group cohesion, which are closely related to the measurement of discrimination but also to the levels of tolerance/acceptance of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity.

Interestingly, the above measurements concern the self-assessment of respondents either of their own situation or of the situation of other groups in their country and/or their own level of tolerance/acceptance of specific minority groups or types of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. Assessing inter-group cohesion actually brings us very close to the wider field of assessing social and political tolerance.

**Table: Examples of Indicators Measuring Inter-Group Cohesion**

SOURCE	WHAT
Fund for Peace	Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
	Rating on level of uneven economic development along group lines
Minorities at Risk	Level of economic and political discrimination against minorities in country, aggregated by group
World Values Survey	“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors.” People of a different race or caste, percentage mentioned
	“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors.” People of a different religion, percentage mentioned
	“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors.” People of a different language, percentage mentioned
	“I now want to ask you how much you trust various groups of people. Using the responses on this card, could you tell me how much you trust people of another religion?” Percentage who trust “not very much” or “not at all”
	“I now want to ask you how much you trust various groups of people. Using the responses on this card, could you tell me how much you trust people of another nationality?” Percentage who trust “not very much” or “not at all”
Latinobarometer	On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘there is no discrimination’ and 10 is ‘there is a lot of discrimination’, could you tell me if there is or is not discrimination against indigenous people in [this country] in the [workplace/courts/school system/political parties/police]?” Average level, among all respondents in country who identify as indigenous or mestizo
	On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘there is no discrimination’ and 10 is ‘there is a lot of discrimination’, could you tell me if there is or is not discrimination against indigenous people in [this country] in the [workplace/courts/school system/political parties/police]?” Average level, among all respondents in country who identify as black or mulatto
	“As far as you know or have heard, which of the following groups is most discriminated against in this country - or are there no such groups?” Combined percentage citing: blacks, indigenous peoples, mulattos, mestizos, Asians, Arabs, Jews, immigrants, the disabled, those with AIDS.
Afrobarometer	Proportion of population reporting that their economic situation is the ‘same’ as other ethnic groups in country
	Proportion of population reporting that their political situation is the ‘same’ as other ethnic groups in country
	Proportion of population reporting that their ethnic group is ‘never’ treated unfairly in country

*Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of the sources quoted.*

## 2

# TOLERANCE INDICATORS

Studying tolerance through quantitative indicators has developed as a field of political inquiry within the larger domain of measuring the quality of democracy in modern societies. Tolerance is seen as a necessary precondition, although not a sufficient one, for democracy by itself, regardless of context (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Lipset, 1959; Mill, 1859).

Survey studies of political tolerance were pioneered by researchers in the US in the 1950s and 1960s mainly in connection to Cold War fears and the Civil Rights movement. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to policies that challenged the levels of intolerance of the white majority. Widmalm and Oscarsson (2008) note that Stouffer's seminal study 1955 and his continued work in 1973 laid the ground for how most studies have since formulated surveys on political tolerance. Levels of political tolerance/intolerance in a society are measured by asking respondents to name the most disliked group in society. Then the respondent is asked questions about which rights should be extended to this least liked group. The rationale of this type of measurement of political tolerance is that a tolerant person may disagree on what other people think and say, but s/he may want to protect their right to be different. During the last 20 years, there has been a large number of quantitative studies assessing how various socio-economic factors, for example, levels of education, religious preferences, ideological preferences, gender, or ethnic origin are associated with levels of political tolerance (Cigler & Joslyn, 2002; Gibson, 1995, 2002; Gibson, 2006; Mutz, 2002; Persell, Green & Gurevich, 2001; Reimer & Park, 2001)

Widmalm and Oscarsson (2008) distinguish between social and political tolerance. Political tolerance is measured on the basis of Stouffer's questions as described above (for instance should the most disliked group be allowed to hold public demonstrations?). Social tolerance is measured through the classical 'neighbour question'. Notably people are asked to say whether they would object to have people of different race, immigrants, homosexuals, and people who have AIDS, respectively, as neighbours.

Similar to the above, the Civic Education Project Survey<sup>11</sup> measures several dimensions of civic and social engagement which include political engagement, civic engagement, voting, trust, political knowledge and tolerance. Tolerance is typically defined as respect for the civil liberties, particularly free speech rights, of unpopular groups. The Civic Education Project Survey includes an especially stringent test of political tolerance because they focus on antidemocratic groups. Respondents are asked whether “members of groups that are against democracy” should be allowed democratic participation and free speech such as host television shows, hold demonstrations, run for office, or making public speeches.

The New Zealand social survey on the impact of education offers however a more developed and detailed measure of tolerance as a public attitude. It distinguishes between tolerance of ethnic diversity, tolerance of immigrants and tolerance of different values and ways of living:

**Tolerance of Ethnic Diversity** (*Is it good for NZ to be made up of different ethnic groups?*)

**Tolerance of Immigrants** (*Is it good for NZ to have immigrants who are from many different cultures?*)

**Tolerance of different values and ways of living** (*Is it good that people in NZ can have different values? Is it good that people in NZ can have different ways of living?*)

The NZ survey found that 83% of New Zealanders aged 25 to 64 in the NZGSS agreed strongly or very strongly that ethnic diversity is a good thing. The survey also found that tolerance of ethnic diversity was moderately to strongly associated with education. The likelihood of agreeing strongly or very strongly was highest for those with bachelors or postgraduate qualifications. Those with no qualifications, level 1 school qualifications or level 1 to 4 tertiary certificates were less likely to agree.

The same survey also found that 68% of New Zealanders aged 25 to 64 in the NZGSS agreed strongly or very strongly that it was good to have immigrants from many different cultures. Agreement was again positively associated with higher levels of education. This association was strong for NZ-born. It was weaker but still present for overseas-born adults.


93% of New Zealanders aged 25 to 64 in the NZGSS agreed strongly or very strongly with the first question on values (notably that it was good to have in NZ people with different values). 91% agreed strongly or very strongly with the second question notably that it is good that people in NZ have different ways of living. Education was positively associated with both these indicators. But unlike other indicators, this positive association was only present for those who agreed ‘very strongly’. When those who agreed ‘strongly’ were considered together with those who agreed ‘very strongly’, there was no apparent association between these indicators and education. These were the only indicators from those selected for this report where the relationship of these first two positive responses had a different relationship.

For more see: [www.educationcounts.govt.nz/publications/schooling/78889/1.-summary](http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/publications/schooling/78889/1.-summary)

The OECD indicator on tolerance, on the other hand, differs from the above. Drawing upon the Gallup<sup>12</sup> World Poll, the OECD tolerance index is the ratio of the people who respond yes to the question of whether the city or area where they live is

<sup>11</sup> <http://civiceducationproject.org/survey/index.php.html>

<sup>12</sup> The Gallup World Poll is conducted in over 140 countries around the world based on a common questionnaire, translated into the predominant languages of each country. With few exceptions, all samples are probability based and nationally representative of the resident population aged 15 years and over in the entire country, including rural areas. Sample sizes vary between around 1,000 and 4,000, depending on the country.



a good place or not a good place to live for ethnic minorities, migrants, or gay or lesbian people to all people contacted. In other words, here the measurement is more indirect. Instead of asking people whether they agree or disagree with the 'neighbour question' or the 'democratic rights' question, respondents are asked to evaluate their own community. This takes away somehow the value judgement inherent in these two questions. It makes it more neutral and seeks to assess the conditions of life intersubjectively rather than measure the attitudes of respondents.

While the above indicators may be seen as partly overlapping they are probably better than the neighbour test or the political tolerance question because they seek to measure attitudes towards ethnic diversity as such, cultural and value diversity and finally diversity linked with immigration.

### 3

## THE ACCEPT PLURALISM TOLERANCE INDICATORS

Interestingly none of the above tolerance indicators measures actual policies concerning cultural diversity and/or practices that address the claims of minority and immigrant groups. They measure either public attitudes or the self-assessment of the levels of toleration or acceptance in a community by the people who live in it. At the same time there is a wide set of social indicators covering related fields such as the quality of democracy, citizenship policies and practices, and intergroup cohesion.

Our set of Tolerance Indicators comes to fill a gap within this rich literature of social indicators, looking at two specific areas of public life that we believe are of paramount importance for shaping social quality in a society. These two fields are education and school life: the *Tolerance In School Life Indicators*; and politics/public life: the *Tolerance in Politics Indicators*.

Our Indicators measure **qualitative aspects of societies' response to minorities and migrants. They offer relative measures (low / medium / high) that form the basis for a comparative account** of toleration and acceptance across Europe.

They aim to **evaluate the tolerance/intolerance situation in society at a given point in time. Our assessment is focused, qualitative and contextually informed** and includes not only policy and legislative frameworks but also to the extent possible social practices which may go beyond policy arrangements and legal rules. Such practices indirectly reflect public attitudes although they are not totally conditioned by the latter.

The indicators are **qualitative** in nature. They capture different aspects of the toleration or acceptance of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in school life and in political life, and are **expressed in the form of scores - Low/Medium/High** - in a particular issue/field and sub-field.

Let us briefly introduce the rationale of these scores, in particular the important distinction between toleration and acceptance, as well as offer some comments regarding the thematic areas where they are applied.



## Toleration and Acceptance

These scores are based on the definition of tolerance elaborated in the ACCEPT PLURALISM project and in particular on our main distinction between tolerance and acceptance. **Tolerance is understood as a minimal concept that involves non-interference with practices or forms of life of others even if one disapproves of them.** Tolerance is in this sense about negative equality: it requires non-interference and non-discrimination more than positive pro-active policy measures or social practices that would ensure equal treatment for minorities and their members.

**By contrast, acceptance** of cultural ethnic and religious diversity may involve the re-making of the public space through **appropriate institutions and policies that actively recognise cultural diversity or that work towards socio-economic inclusion and equal treatment.**

Acceptance involves both respect (for cultural difference) and equality (in matters of cultural or socio-economic rights). For many immigrant populations and post-immigration groups it is in particular *respect* for ethnic or religious identities and their accommodation in public institutions, school life and politics that is at stake. For socio-economically marginalized populations (such as for instance Roma populations across Europe) tolerance, but also decency and respect may be seen to require most importantly socio-economic inclusion and measures that work towards substantive *equality*.<sup>13</sup>

On the basis of this important distinction between tolerance and acceptance, we identify three classes of how cultural difference can be debated, accepted or rejected:

1. Intolerance/rejection;
2. Toleration;
3. Acceptance: recognition and respect as equal and admission as normal

In line with the above we specify three scores for our indicators:

**low** = cultural, ethnic and religious minority and immigrant needs are **ignored, no accommodation**. Minorities/immigrants and their deviation from 'normal' practice are stigmatised and/or outlawed. Minorities/immigrants are excluded from participating fully in aspects of social life.

**medium** = promotes **minimal tolerance** of diversity and limited opportunities for minority inclusion. Individual and group difference is allowed to exist within the public space but no special measures are taken towards their accommodation and inclusion.

**high** = promotes **positive acceptance/accommodation of diversity**, not only makes room but also offers arrangements for recognising the needs of minority or immigrant pupils; ensures equality and decent treatment; respects minority choices and ensures participation.

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<sup>13</sup> Respect and equality are two important parts of any understanding of social justice (see Parekh 2004, Tully 2000, Fraser and Honneth 2003). They often appear in conjunction and minorities with grievances regarding the marginalization of their identity claims (such as Muslim populations in many European countries) also tend to be economically disadvantaged. Yet it is empirically evident that equality and respect do not always overlap. In fact, the misapplication of either perspective risks harming the interests of the minority populations in question. This is not meant to suggest that the two objectives are mutually exclusive; it means that there are two injustices that are different in kind and that both require our concern in addressing contemporary European diversity challenges with these indicators and more generally.

## Thematic areas

ACCEPT PLURALISM applies these scores in two sets of indicators that refer to two different thematic areas: indicators that concern education and school life; and indicators that concern politics and public life. Where this distinction is appropriate, we develop separate indicators of ethnic diversity tolerance and indicators of religious diversity tolerance.

Let us explain the reason for doing so.

In many cases, the terms cultural and ethnic diversity are used interchangeably or as synonyms while they are generally distinguished from religious diversity. Looking closely into educational and political realities one realises that tolerance towards ethnic and towards religious diversity does not necessarily go hand in hand. The reasons are twofold: ethno-cultural groups and religious minorities overlap only partly without however completely coinciding. Thus, the term ‘Muslims’ may encompass people of several ethnic and national affiliations. By contrast, the term ‘Roma’ may refer to people who are Christian or Muslims or have no religion. Migrant populations are often culturally distinct from the majority populations both in ethnic and religious terms. For instance, Moroccans in Italy are both ethnically and religiously defined as a minority. In Europe, ethnic and cultural minorities are often native ones while religious minorities (and in particular Muslims) more often than not find their origins in immigration.

Contemporary European societies put great emphasis on their qualities as liberal, secular and democratic. The liberal and secular character of these societies is often seen to be in contrast to the claims of religious minorities. In countries like France religion is not accepted as a legitimate form of diversity to be accommodated in the public space. This rejection does not regard specific religions but rather aims at making the public space completely secular and neutral. This separation of the state and the church and the confinement of religion to the private sphere is not as complete as the French state, adopting an increasingly narrow understanding of *laïcité*, may require it to be. Yet given this increased sensitivity of European societies towards religion and religious diversity, we consider it necessary to assess separately ethnic/cultural and religious tolerance. Regarding the role of religion in public life as well as regarding significant differences between understandings of ‘acceptance’ of religious and ethnic ‘difference’ our qualitative indicators are contextually nuanced without being culturally relativist.

**Our Tolerance Index translates qualitative evaluations into comparative assessments: low, medium and high.** We apply these assessments in areas of interest within the fields of education and politics – such as the school curriculum or minority representation in politics (see below) – to evaluate policies and practices of minority/immigrant accommodation. We are not concerned with public attitudes and opinion polls as most social and political tolerance measurements have done so far. We rather offer a qualitative assessment of the situation in each country with a view to using these indicators as **a policy tool for monitoring and self-assessment** as well as possibly **policy development in the field of cultural, religious and ethnic diversity.**

We thus offer a three-level assessment of areas that are relevant to determine levels of acceptance in each country under study. While we believe that our indicators are unique in offering this three-level assessment, we recognise that our proposed indicators have also an important limitation, they only focus on two areas of

public life and public policy: education/school life and politics. While the selection of these two areas leaves out important fields that become sites of contention in relation to cultural diversity such as welfare policies and practices, citizenship policies or media regulations, we have adopted this limited approach on purpose. The main reason is that indicators assessing citizenship policies are successfully implemented by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX [www.mipex.eu](http://www.mipex.eu)), are currently further developed by the EUDO project (<http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators>), while media diversity indicators have most recently been developed and implemented by the MEDIVA project ([www.mediva.eu](http://www.mediva.eu)).

## 3.1 School Life Indicators

Our Tolerance in Schools indicators are organised by reference to the various components of school life and seek to take into account the various dilemmas, claims and contested issues that may arise in the daily life of schools in the countries studied. They are based on our empirical and theoretical analysis of challenges that schools in the 16 European countries studied face when dealing with ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. Our Tolerance in School Life indicators are organised into three sets:

### Indicator 1: Presentation of self and interaction in the school

This indicator looks at various aspects of everyday school life and on how students, teachers and parents interact in the school context. It includes issues of dress code, organisation of school life in terms of festivities' calendar and the organisation of teacher-parents meetings.

- Dress code for pupils and teachers (wearing of religious symbols, adaptation of school uniforms)
- Consultation between parents and teachers
- School festivities calendar organisation
- Mode of celebration of religious and national festivities

### Indicator 2: Curriculum and Pedagogy

This set of indicators looks at how the school curriculum and pedagogical philosophy promotes tolerance and/or acceptance of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. It investigates this both at the level of curriculum subjects and organisation and at the level of special arrangements for specific subjects that can be sensitive for minority and immigrant children.

- Civic education – teaching about diversity
- Integration of the country's immigration history in national history curricula
- Integration of the country's historical minorities in the national history curriculum
- Organisation of religion and mother tongue classes

### Indicator 3: Structure of the Education System

This set of indicators considers whether the structure of the education system is conducive to the well-being of ethnic or religious minority groups and offers mechanisms and institutions to respond to their claims for tolerance and acceptance.

- Parallel education (voluntary) – ethnic or religious schools as a matter of minority choice
- Desegregation – integrated schools and classrooms as a matter of minority choice
- Financial investment – public education opportunities for socio-economic improvement funding targeting schools in socio-economically disadvantaged areas to increase opportunities for mobility
- Employment practices for minority teachers and administrators
- Teacher training programmes – dedicated training for teachers to combat prejudicial treatment of minority children

All indicators are preceded by the following question:

**Which of the following sentences best reflects the situation in schools of your country/region<sup>14</sup>?**

Indicators are assessed by researchers on the basis of data collected concerning relevant policies, practices and discourses.

**In the ACCEPT PLURALISM project, we implement these indicators in a pilot study on the basis mainly of the data collected during our case studies on school life and supported by relevant scholarly literature or survey data where necessary.** This pilot study applies the three sets of school life indicators in selected countries, namely those where there are significant challenges in the area in question.

If the indicators were to be used to assess past conditions or re-used to assess conditions in the future, **they should still be assessed by experts (be they researchers or policy makers) on the basis of a focused and contextual analysis.** Indicators apply to mainstream – state funded or private schools – except otherwise stated (see indicator 3 on the structure of the education system).

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<sup>14</sup> In some of the countries studied education is a regional or local policy issue. In those cases, the tolerance indicator is assessed for the region in question and not for the entire country

# INDICATOR 1

## Presentation of self and interaction in the school

Indicator 1.1  
MINORITY DRESS CODE  
FOR PUPILS

LOW – non tolerance

There are different provisions regarding minority and majority religions: Thus (where religious symbols are authorized) only majority religious symbols are allowed while minority religious symbols are banned.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

No matter what the type of school and its rules regarding dress/uniform, there is a level of practical accommodation: for instance minority religion pupils are allowed to change inside the school if religious dress is not authorised within the school but required by some pupils in their daily life.

HIGH – acceptance

Conditions are equally applied: any permission and/or restrictions concerning religious dress code affect equally minority and majority religion pupils.

Indicator 1.2  
MINORITY DRESS CODE  
FOR TEACHERS

LOW – non tolerance

There are different provisions regarding minority and majority religions: Thus (where religious symbols are authorized) only majority religious symbols are allowed while minority religious symbols are banned.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

No matter what the type of school, there is a level of practical accommodation: for instance minority religion teachers are allowed to change inside the school if religious dress is not authorised within the school but required by some teachers in their daily life.

HIGH – acceptance

Conditions are equally applied: any permission and/or restrictions concerning religious dress code affect equally minority and majority religion teachers.

Indicator 1.3  
CONSULTATION BETWEEN  
PARENTS AND TEACHERS

LOW – non tolerance

Teachers or school principals organise consultation meetings between parents and teaching staff without the participation of minority parents or without assuring that migrant or minority parents receive and comprehend relevant information. There are no provisions in place to address linguistic or cultural obstacles that affect migrant or minority participation in consultations.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Teachers or school principals organise consultative meetings with migrant or minority parents but there are only minimal measures in place to make sure that parents understand the relevant issues affecting them. There is some, but no sustained, effort to ensure that linguistic or cultural obstacles towards parental participation are addressed.

HIGH – acceptance

Teacher-parent consultations are organised in a way that ensures that migrant or minority parents receive the relevant information and achieve an understanding of the local issues as well as of the school system more generally. Where there are obstacles in the way of parental participation in these meetings, special efforts are made to ensure the full participation of migrant/minority parents.

<p>Indicator 1.4 SCHOOL RELIGIOUS FESTIVITIES CALENDAR ORGANISATION</p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> The school calendar is organised on the basis of the national majority religion. No deviations are allowed – absence of minority or immigrant children on days of their group’s religious celebration are not justified. No consideration of such celebrations is taken in the school exam, trip or other activities’ calendar organisation.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> The school calendar of festivities and activities follows closely that of the national majority religion but minority and immigrant students can have their absences justified. Requests for rescheduling of some activity or exam can be individually examined and possibly accommodated.</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> The school calendar celebrates the religious festivities of major groups in society, not only of the majority. While for instance there may be longer holidays for the Christmas period, there are days off for the Chinese new year, the end of the Ramadan festivity etc.</p>
<p>Indicator 1.5 SCHOOL ETHNIC/NATIONAL FESTIVITIES CALENDAR ORGANISATION</p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> The school calendar is organised on the basis of the dominant nation celebrations. No deviations are allowed – absence of minority or immigrant children on days of their group’s ethnic or national day celebrations is not justified. No consideration of such celebrations is taken in the school exam, trip or other activities’ calendar organisation.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> The school calendar of festivities and activities follows closely that of the national majority but minority and immigrant students can have their absences justified. Requests for rescheduling of some activity or exam can be individually examined and possibly accommodated.</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> The school calendar celebrates the ethnic/national festivities of major groups in society, not only of the majority. The school takes a day off as appropriate or organises a similar event to celebrate both majority and minority national/ethnic celebration days.</p>
<p>Indicator 1.6 MODE OF CELEBRATION OF NATIONAL / ETHNIC FESTIVITIES</p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> The school organises festivities only in relation to the national majority celebration days. There is no consideration of minority festivities and/or of difficulties that minority or migrant children may have in taking part in these festivities (because for instance their ethnic or religious community may be negatively portrayed in these festivities as ‘inferior’ or ‘inimical’ to the national majority). Participation in these festivities is obligatory for the students.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> The school organises festivities only in relation to the national majority celebration days. However, participation in these festivities is not obligatory for minority and migrant children if they feel uncomfortable.</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> The school organises celebrations not only for the national majority festivities but also celebrates important days for ethnic minorities (E.g. national independence days or days relating to the special cultural or ethnic tradition of a given group. Festivities organised by the school with the explicit aim of bringing majority children closer to the special traditions, music, folklore of minority cultures also qualify here). Majority and minority pupils are required to participate to both.</p>

Indicator 1.7  
MODE OF CELEBRATION  
OF RELIGIOUS FESTIVITIES

LOW - non tolerance

The school organises religious celebrations only in relation to the national majority religion. There is no consideration of the different faith of minority or immigrant children. Participation in these festivities is obligatory for the students.

OR

Religious festivities are excluded from the school programme. The school applies a strongly secular approach.

MEDIUM - minimal tolerance

The school organises celebrations/special events only in relation to the national majority religious festivities. However, participation is not obligatory for minority and migrant children if they are of a different religion.

HIGH - acceptance

The school organises celebrations not only for the national majority religious festivities but also for minority religious celebrations (e.g. the end of the Ramadan, or the Jewish Passover). Both majority and minority pupils are required to participate to both.

Indicator 1.8  
PROVISIONS FOR FORMAL  
PRAYER FOR MINORITY  
RELIGIONS AT SCHOOL

LOW - non tolerance

Minority/immigrant pupils are banned from prayer or other forms of worship during school hours and on school premises, including during breaks and free time.

MEDIUM - minimal tolerance

Some arrangements are in place to facilitate individual prayer/worship. This can include exemptions for religious pupils during breaks and/or space made available on school premises. No particular measures towards inter-faith understanding are in place.

HIGH - acceptance

There is an active effort by school authorities to accommodate prayer/worship. Space is provided if necessary for groups of pupils to congregate. Where there are possible conflicts with the requirements of education or the school day, compromises are negotiated in good faith. There is an active effort by school authorities to provide for understanding between (differently) religious and non-religious pupils.

Indicator 1.9  
COLLECTIVE WORSHIP

LOW - non tolerance

Where it exists, collective worship during school hours or other ceremonies of a primarily symbolic purpose reflect majority beliefs and either ignore or reject beliefs of minority/immigrant pupils.

MEDIUM - minimal tolerance

Where it exists, religious minority or non-religious pupils are exempted from collective worship.

HIGH - acceptance

Religious meetings, where such meetings are organised, take positively into account the diversity of beliefs in the student body and seek to promote mutual respect and understanding.

## INDICATOR 2

### Curriculum and Pedagogy

<p>Indicator 2.1 CIVIC EDUCATION. TEACHING ABOUT DIVERSITY</p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> There is no civic education course in lower high school (around the 11-15 age bracket) and/or civic education only includes teaching on the country’s political system and institutions with no reference to the cultural, ethnic or religious diversity of the country.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> Civic education courses include specific references to cultural, ethnic or religious diversity, however the courses are taught in an abstract or general way without presenting students with questions about particular examples pertaining to real situations that they may face in and out of school.</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> Civic education courses give significant priority to the value of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity and include experiential learning, including examples that are relevant to the contemporary reality and situations that children face in and out of school.</p>
<p>Indicator 2.2 INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTRY’S IMMIGRATION HISTORY IN NATIONAL HISTORY CURRICULA</p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> The national history narrative reflects only the majority view point. There is no consideration of the contribution of immigrants in the making (past or present) of the nation or the state.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> There is an acknowledgement of the multi-ethnic or multi-cultural or multi-religious composition of the nation. But there is no appreciation of multiple perspectives in the national narrative and in particular of migrants’ experiences of inequality, discrimination or exploitation.</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> The national history curriculum has been or is being revised to accommodate for the experiences immigrant groups. Tensions and alternative viewpoints are given due consideration and the critical role of history as making sense of our past, present and future is emphasised.</p>
<p>Indicator 2.3 INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTRY’S HISTORICAL MINORITIES IN THE NATIONAL HISTORY CURRICULUM</p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> The national history narrative reflects only the majority view point. There is no consideration of the contribution of native minorities in the making (past or present) of the nation or the state.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> There is an acknowledgement of the multi-ethnic or multi-cultural or multi-religious composition of the nation. But there is no appreciation of multiple perspectives in the national narrative and in particular of native minority historical experiences of domination and inequality or discrimination. Accounts of past events, heroes and national myths adopt only the dominant majority perspective.</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> The national history curriculum has been or is being revised to accommodate for the experiences of minority groups. Tensions and alternative viewpoints are given due consideration and the critical role of history as making sense of our past, present and future is emphasised.</p>



Indicator 2.4  
ORGANISATION OF  
RELIGION CLASSES

*(For schools that are  
completely secularised this  
indicator does not apply)*

LOW – non tolerance

Religion courses include the teaching of the majority religion and not just history of religions. The majority view point is dominant (the majority religion is the only true religion, other religious traditions if taught, are clearly signalled as misguided and ‘wrong’). Religion classes are compulsory and no alternative courses are offered.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Pupils can be exempted from religion classes upon request by their parents. No alternative arrangements are made to accommodate their special requests or needs.

HIGH – acceptance

When a sufficient number of pupils requests alternative arrangements, instruction in other religions is offered including also philosophy classes for children whose parents are atheists. There is also a possibility to opt for a completely different course (e.g. study or free time).

Indicator 2.5  
ORGANISATION OF  
MOTHER TONGUE  
CLASSES FOR NATIVE  
MINORITIES

LOW – non tolerance

No teaching of their mother tongue for children from large minority groups.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Teaching of mother tongue for native minority children can be arranged within school premises and hours but is not paid for/subsidised by the state. Parents have to contribute for the payment of teachers and/or education materials (books etc).

HIGH – acceptance

Minority language teaching and specific courses taught in mother tongue of migrants/minorities. In other words not only minority/migrant mother tongue is taught but it is also used as a medium for instruction in other courses.

# INDICATOR 3

## Structure of the education system

### Indicator 3.1 PARALLEL EDUCATION (VOLUNTARY)

*(This indicator is about the option of creating non-governmental-schools on the basis of a religious denomination, whether (partially) funded or not)*

#### LOW – non tolerance

There are virtually no non-governmental schools catering to specific religious or ethnic/national groups in the entire country/region, at least not for children (5-16) and at least not recognized as constituting a way of fulfilling compulsory education.

#### MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

There are non-governmental schools catering to specific religious or ethnic/national groups (accredited), but these do not (or hardly) receive public funding AND/OR they have very little meaningful “associational freedoms” AND/OR it is very difficult for newcomers and minorities to create such schools.

#### HIGH – acceptance

There are non-governmental schools catering to specific religious or ethnic/national groups, they receive (substantial) public funding, they have (substantial ) associational freedoms), there are schools for religious (immigrant) newcomers and minorities.

### Indicator 3.2 DESEGREGATION

#### LOW – non tolerance

De facto or state-sponsored segregation in classrooms and/or schools against the wishes of the local minority. Minority children denied equal access to educational institutions that meet basic standards.

#### MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Various efforts made at desegregation, but with minimal impact on larger problem. Some minority children integrated into special schools targeted for desegregation policies, but most minority students remain in segregated classrooms/schools.

#### HIGH – acceptance

Sustained system-wide desegregation efforts to combat segregation in classroom and school. Has backing of state and local education officials. Significant inroads made toward desegregation.

### Indicator 3.3 FINANCIAL INVESTMENT

#### LOW – non tolerance

There is a systematic neglect of the needs of schools in socio-economically deprived areas, even where those schools are shown to be unable to meet basic standards of educational provision. Opportunities for socio-economic integration of minority/migrant children are minimal to non-existent.

#### MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Some targeted funding for schools in socio-economically deprived areas meeting minimum standards of provision. Increased opportunities for educational and socio-economic advancement for minority children (though still severely limited).

#### HIGH – acceptance

Robust investment strategy in schools in socio-economically deprived areas. Often combined with desegregation efforts in practice. Programmes targeting pupils in these schools to increase opportunities for educational and socio-economic advancement.

Indicator 3.4  
RECRUITMENT OF  
MINORITY/IMMIGRANT  
TEACHERS

LOW – non tolerance

Minority or immigrant teachers/staff are not hired.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Minority teachers/staff are incorporated but are not given any preference even in schools/areas where minorities are numerically predominant.

HIGH – acceptance

Statewide hiring practices that give preferential treatment to minority teachers/staff. Typically combined with changes to curriculum that place emphasis on minority culture. Increased opportunities for advancement for minority teachers/staff, also role models for minority children.

Indicator 3.5  
TEACHER TRAINING  
PROGRAMMES

LOW – non tolerance

Teachers are given no specific instruction in how to deal with minority children or recognise racist/prejudicial treatment of minority children. The result is racism, and prejudicial treatment from both majority children and teachers go unchecked.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Minimal provision of teacher training to combat racism in schools and the classroom. Programmes in place but lacking the strong support of the state and school administrators. Effects minimal.

HIGH – acceptance

All teachers are subject to training (retraining) in sensitivity to cultural difference. Measurable reduction in prejudicial and racist treatment in the classroom. Increased equality and respect for minority children.

Indicator 3.6  
PROMOTING A CULTURE  
OF ANTI-RACISM AND  
NON-DISCRIMINATION

LOW – non tolerance

Anti-discrimination regulations have not been put in place or those that have been adopted within the respective educational systems remain largely ineffectual in addressing differential treatment and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion. State bodies make no systematic or serious effort to monitor the effects of racism.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Anti-discrimination regulations exist but are not strongly enforced and not properly monitored.

Racism and open forms of discrimination are disavowed and there are some mechanisms in place to address and monitor visible acts.

HIGH – acceptance (*effective application/enforcement and control of the anti-discrimination regulations in place*)

Anti-discrimination regulations are enforced effectively and properly monitored.

There is concern not just with acts of discrimination but also with the institutional culture of the educational system and how it impacts upon the prospects and well-being of minority children.

## 3.2 Tolerance in Politics Indicators

Our Tolerance in politics indicators are organised by reference to the various aspects of political life and seek to take into account the various dilemmas, claims and contested issues that may arise in the sphere of politics in the countries studied. They are based on our empirical and theoretical analysis of political challenges in the 16 European countries studied face when dealing with ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. They are thus organised into three sets:

Indicator 4: Tolerance of intolerant discourses and practices in political life

What are the limits of intolerance in the political life of European countries?

In particular we look at

- The participation of far right parties in government
- Racist discourses (their mainstreaming)
- Racist violence incidents
- Measures and initiatives combating racist discourses and practices

Indicator 5: Local or national policies of exclusion of minorities and immigrants from public life

The institutional limitations of the respect of minorities' rights. We study in particular

- Rules concerning the establishment of places of worship
- Policies concerning ethnic businesses

Indicator 6: Special arrangements for the representation of minorities/immigrants

What are the institutional limits of tolerance to minority claims?

- Existence of special political and institutional channels for minority participation
- Minority representation in politics
- Minority mobilisation
- Local voting rights for non-nationals

All indicators are preceded by the following question:

**Which of the following sentences best reflects best the political life in your country?**

Indicators are assessed by researchers on the basis of data collected concerning relevant policies, practices and discourses.

**In the ACCEPT PLURALISM project, we implement these indicators in a pilot study on the basis mainly of the data collected during our case studies on political and public life and supported by relevant scholarly literature or survey data where necessary.** This pilot study applies the three sets of indicators in selected countries, namely those where there are significant challenges in the area in question.

If the indicators were to be used to assess past conditions or re-used in the future to assess in the future, **they should still be assessed by experts (be they researchers or policy makers) on the basis of a focused and contextual analysis.**

## INDICATOR 4

### Tolerance of intolerant discourses and practices in political life

<p>Indicator 4.1 EXISTENCE OF LEGISLATION THAT PUNISHES RACIST DISCOURSE</p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> Legislation punishing racist discourse and actions, or incitement to ethnic or religious hatred does not exist or is inadequate for current challenges of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in the given country.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> Legislation exists but includes clauses that make it difficult to apply (e.g.: it requires for proofs that are very difficult to obtain; or it requires that racism must have been the only motivation of an action or speech, etc.).</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> Legislation exists, is up to standard and is applied without important legal or procedural problems.</p>
<p>Indicator 4.2 APPLICATION OF SUCH LEGISLATION IN RECENT TIMES</p> <p><i>(period of reference: last 10 years)</i></p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> The legislation exists but has never been applied.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> The legislation exists but so far cases brought to court have shown that (a) the law is problematic (because of its loopholes or its restrictive nature); or (b) there is tacit reluctance to apply the law and convict the perpetrators; or (c) both (a) and (b).</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> The legislation exists and is consistently applied.</p>
<p>Indicator 4.3 ELECTORAL SHARE OF FAR RIGHT/ANTI-IMMIGRANT AND ANTI-MINORITY PARTIES</p> <p><i>(The short term ‘far right parties’ is used to refer to parties that are extreme right and engage into anti-immigrant or anti-minority discourse and actions. They may qualify even for just one of those issues i.e. being of far right and/or being anti-immigrant and/or being anti-minority, e.g. anti-Roma)</i></p>	<p><b>LOW – non tolerance</b> Far right parties exist and have gained more than the minimal threshold for entering Parliament in the last national election.</p> <p><b>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance</b> Far right parties exist and have gained between 1% and the minimum threshold for entering Parliament in the last national election.</p> <p><b>HIGH – acceptance</b> Far right parties if they exist at all gained less than 1% of the national vote in the last national election.</p>

Indicator 4.4  
RACIST VIOLENCE  
IN PUBLIC LIFE  
(ETHNICALLY MOTIVATED)

LOW – non tolerance

Public life is characterised by frequent incidents of racist violence against ethnic minority or immigrant individuals (or groups of people) because of their ethnic affiliation. According to NGOs, state authorities and other sources there have been more than 3 incidents of ethnically motivated racist violence per 1 million people in the country during the last year.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Racist violence against individuals or groups of people of ethnic minority or immigrant origin is a rare incident. There has been between 1 and 3 such incidents per 1 million people monitored during the last year. There are campaigns against such ethnically motivated racist violence but they are small campaigns of left wing or pro immigrant organisations without a massive appeal.

HIGH – acceptance

There have been between 0 and 1 incidents per 1 million people of racist violence against ethnic minority or immigrant individuals (or groups of people) because of their ethnic affiliation during the last year and there are massive initiatives against racism involving several stakeholders (both state and civil society).

Indicator 4.5  
RACIST VIOLENCE  
IN PUBLIC LIFE  
(RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED)

LOW – non tolerance

Public life is characterised by frequent incidents of racist violence against religious minority individuals (or groups of people) because of their faith. According to NGOs, state authorities and other sources there have been more than 3 incidents of religiously motivated racist violence per 1 million people in the country during the last year.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Racist violence against individuals or groups of people of a minority religion is a rare incident. There has been between 1 and 3 such incidents per 1 million people monitored during the last year. There are campaigns against such racist violence but they are small campaigns of left wing or pro immigrant organisations without a massive appeal.

HIGH – acceptance

There have been between 0 and 1 incidents of racist violence per 1 million people against religious minority individuals (or groups of people) because of their different faith during the last year and there are massive initiatives against racism involving several stakeholders (both state and civil society).

Indicator 4.6  
INFLUENCE OF RADICAL  
FAR RIGHT OR ANTI-  
IMMIGRANT PARTIES

LOW – non tolerance

The current government either subscribes to radical far-right and/or anti-immigrant views, or relies to a significant extent on the support of parties representing such views.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Radical far-right or anti-immigrant parties have no direct impact on government, but ruling parties may offer concessions to such parties in order to gain their support.

HIGH – acceptance

Radical far right parties are marginalized and/or contained. There is no collaboration or mutual support between them and the parties in government.

Indicator 4.7  
MEDIA MAINSTREAMING  
OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT OR  
ANTI-MINORITY POSITIONS

*(To be assessed on the basis  
of existing studies-media  
surveys)*

LOW - non tolerance

The understanding that there has been 'too much tolerance' of migrants/minorities and/or that there is 'too much diversity' dominates mainstream public debate and mainstream media. Such understandings are prominently rehearsed by mainstream politicians and inform governmental agendas.

MEDIUM - minimal tolerance

There is a mixed picture of pro- and anti-migrant/minority rhetoric and both positions, in public debate, the media and on governmental agendas, have supporters and defenders of relatively similar size. While notions such as 'too much tolerance' and 'too much diversity' have some traction, their political impact is limited.

HIGH - acceptance

Anti-migrant or anti-minority views are relatively marginalized in mainstream political debate.

## INDICATOR 5

Local or national policies of exclusion of minorities and immigrants from public life

Indicator 5.1  
PUBLIC PLACES  
OF WORSHIP

LOW - non tolerance

Minority religious groups are not allowed to have any public places for worship, formal or informal.

MEDIUM - minimal tolerance

Minority religious groups are allowed to have informal places for worship or are allowed to have formal places of worship but requirements are so stringent that in practice this is not possible. Informal public places of worship are however de facto tolerated.

HIGH - acceptance

Minority religious groups can have their formal places of worship.

Indicator 5.2  
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS  
FOR ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS  
BUSINESS

LOW - non tolerance

The municipality imposes very stringent requirements regarding opening hours or types of business with a view of driving out of the area businesses that are typically ethnic or religious such as corner shops which stay open late, ethnic restaurants or butchers providing for halal meat.

MEDIUM - minimal tolerance

The municipality does not impose requirements and restrictions, and provides no subsidies and support. Minority or ethnic businesses operate as any other business.

HIGH - acceptance

The municipality provides for subsidies and support to ensure that shops that are catering to the needs of specific minority or immigrant groups (e.g. halal butcher shops or other types of shops) exist in the area. The municipality sees such ethnic entrepreneurship and the existence of such shops as an added values for the neighbourhood recognizing the diversity of its population and perhaps even creating 'business' by the local and tourist population.

## INDICATOR 6

### Special arrangements for the representation of minorities/immigrants

<p>Indicator 6.1 EXISTENCE OF OFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF NATIVE ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS MINORITIES</p>	<p>LOW – non tolerance There are no such official institutions for the representation of native ethnic or religious minority groups.</p> <p>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance There are such official institutions but are only of a consultative character. They have no real administrative or political power.</p> <p>HIGH – acceptance There are such official institutions and they have real administrative and political power. They form part of the national political system under special arrangements to account for their special status (e.g. territorial concentration, representing people with particular living and working conditions (e.g. nomadic), numerical size very small and would otherwise not be represented in national bodies).</p>
<p>Indicator 6.2 EXISTENCE OF OFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF MIGRANTS <i>(e.g. local migrant councils)</i></p>	<p>LOW – non tolerance There are no such official institutions for the representation of migrants at local or national level.</p> <p>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance There are such official institutions but are only of a consultative character. They have no power. Their role mainly pertains to migration related issues not to mainstream issues.</p> <p>HIGH – acceptance There are such official institutions and they have real administrative local political power (migrants here are intended as non citizens but they may be able to vote at local elections). They form part of the national political system and consider both migration related and mainstream general issues.</p>
<p>Indicator 6.3 EXISTENCE OF PROVISIONS FOR MINORITY CANDIDATES AT THE PARTY LEVEL</p>	<p>LOW – non tolerance There are no special provisions by political parties (e.g. in terms of selecting candidates in specific electoral districts or at national level) for ensuring that some ethnic or religious minority candidates will be elected and participate in government.</p> <p>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance The practice of providing for the selection of ethnic or religious minority candidates in specific districts is standard for political parties, but there is no institutional provision for such a practice.</p> <p>HIGH – acceptance There are ethnic and/or religious quotas in political parties (e.g. in terms of supporting a minority candidate in specific districts and/or at the national level to ensure that minority voices are represented in governance and politics).</p>
<p>Indicator 6.4 LOCAL VOTING RIGHTS FOR NON NATIONALS</p>	<p>LOW – non tolerance No local voting rights for non nationals.</p> <p>MEDIUM – minimal tolerance Local voting rights for non nationals subject to 5 or more years of residence, with additional requirements (e.g. a certain type of permit), and/or subject to reciprocity clauses (i.e. that the country of origin reciprocates such rights).</p> <p>HIGH – acceptance Local voting rights for non nationals exist for people who have been living in the country for 5 years or less without any special additional requirements.</p>



Indicator 6.5  
MINORITY MOBILIZATION  
AND CLAIMS-MAKING

LOW – non tolerance

Minority mobilizations or claims-making are generally considered illegitimate and/or formally disqualified. There is no place in political life for positions or grievances that are articulated on the basis of minority identities or concerns.

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

There are no formal mechanisms to exclude a minority presence in politics, but an atmosphere that discourages activist from emphasizing concerns and grievances that specifically pertain to their minority position.

HIGH – acceptance

Political claims and grievances that are put forward by minority/immigrant groups are considered to be as valid as any other political position. Minority groups are free to take part in political life and to mobilize/associate on the basis of the political identities they choose.

Indicator 6.6  
REPRESENTATION OF  
MINORITY POLITICIANS  
IN PARLIAMENT

LOW – non tolerance

Politicians of migrant or native minority background are not represented or severely underrepresented in parliament (the proportion of representatives in parliament is less than one third of the overall proportion of ethnic or native minority groups in society).

MEDIUM – minimal tolerance

Politicians of migrant or native minority background are present, but underrepresented in parliament (proportion of representatives in parliament is between one third and two thirds).

HIGH – acceptance

Politicians of migrant or native minority background are fully or almost fully represented in parliament (more than two thirds).

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